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ETERNAL SUNSHINE: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE 2016 GENERAL DATA 
PROTECTION REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
“Blessed are the forgetful, for they get the better even of their blunders.”  
In the movie “Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind,” the couple portrayed 
by Kate Winslet and Jim Carey seeks to erase all memories of each other when 
their relationship turns sour. Aside from the Hollywood gimmicks of memory 
erasure, we all have personal information, memories, and opinions that we wish 
to keep private. The advent of the Internet made this task more complicated.  
The Internet revolutionized the information market by allowing people 
access to a potentially unlimited amount of information with just a computer and 
connection.1 Not only is information on the Internet more accessible, but it is 
also eternal.2 Once information is uploaded, the Internet stores it permanently, 
in what has been called “digital eternity.”3 Hence, when personal information is 
uploaded online,4 our most embarrassing or painful moments may acquire 
lasting significance and haunt our lives.5 The Internet is an integral part of our 
lives to collect information, manage finances, socialize, and shop. Thus, it risks 
infringing upon individuals’ right to privacy. 
In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union recognized the existence 
of the individual right to be forgotten as part of the right to data protection in the 
case Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
Mario Costeja González (Google Spain).6 The right to be forgotten (RTBF) is 
the right of an individual to request search engine providers, such as Google, to 
 
 1 Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY (2016), http://www. 
internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet.  
 2 See Michael Douglas, Questioning the Right to Be Forgotten, 40 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 109 (2015).  
 3 David Lindsay, Digital Eternity or Digital Oblivion: Some Difficulties in Conceptualising and 
Implementing the Right to Be Forgotten, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE LIGHT OF MEDIA CONVERGENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THREE CONTINENTS 322, 324 (Dieter Dörr & Russell L. Weaver eds., 2012). 
 4 Internet users do not always have control over personal information that ends up on the Internet. Some 
of us may have discovered there is more information online than we wished or expected. 
 5 Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017 (2016). 
 6 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014). 
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remove links to personal information that the individual deems prejudicial to 
him or wishes to be removed.7 In May 2016, the European Council and the 
European Parliament enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
to provide a uniform normative framework for the RTBF (also called “right to 
erasure”8) and harmonize data protection across the EU.9  
Google Spain and the GDPR provoked heated criticism and debate as to 
whether the RTBF should be protected. Some authors argued that there is no 
expectation of privacy in personal information online.10 Others predicted that 
protection of the RTBF will force search engines to remove contents from the 
Internet and unduly compress the right of access to information and the freedom 
of expression.11 Technology think tanks maintained that the new regulation, 
while giving EU citizens more control over their personal data, will be 
burdensome to implement for medium and small businesses, governments, and 
civil society groups, as it will require them to jump through too many hoops. 
Namely, the heavy burdens of proof and the high administrative sanctions for 
breach of data protection may discourage the creation of start-ups and impair 
scientific research.12 
In response to the critics, this Comment presents two main arguments.  
First, the new normative framework of the RTBF is consistent with the well-
established protection of the right to respect for private life recognized and 
protected in international law by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
under the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
Second, the GDPR will not harm the right to information because it guides 
search engines to duly balance the right to data protection and the right to 
information. Clear guidance for the data controllers will result in greater 
uniformity of decisions in RTBF claims. Also, the structure of the Internet 
 
 7 Id. at ¶ 21. 
 8 “Right to be forgotten” and “right to erasure” are used as synonyms in the Regulation. For the purpose 
of this Comment, we will only use the term “right to be forgotten.” 
 9 Regulation 2016/679, O.J. L 119/1 (2016). 
 10 Sanduni Wickramasinghe, The Oblivious Oblivion: A Critique on The EUCJ’s Right to Be Forgotten 
6 (Nov. 25, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2782746. 
 11 Douglas, supra note 2, at 110. 
 12 Giacomo Fracassi, #GDPR: Technology Think Thank Criticized New EU Data Regulation, EU 
REPORTER (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2016/04/15/gdpr-technology-think-thank-
criticized-new-eu-data-regulation/.  
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market will safeguard the right to information and the search engine’s economic 
rights.  
This Comment will focus solely on the protection of the RTBF in the EU 
and will not address issues related to the territorial application of the European 
data protection legislation. 
Part I provides an overview of the regulation of the right to private life, 
which germinates the right to data protection and the RTBF. Part II describes the 
evolution of the RTBF, from the Data Protection Directive to the Google Spain 
decision. Part III discusses the new discipline of the RTBF introduced by the 
2016 GDPR. Part IV explains that the GDPR is in line with the EU protection 
of the right to data protection and right to respect for private life and that the 
GDPR will not harm the right to information. 
I. PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The right to protection of personal data is part of the broader human right to 
respect for private life,13 which is recognized and protected both in international 
law and in EU law.14 This section analyzes the scope of the right to respect for 
private life and its evolution, with particular reference to the right to protection 
of personal data. 
A. The International Framework 
The right to respect for private life was first recognized as a human right in 
international law by the ECHR.15 Article 8 of the ECHR establishes that 
“everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.”16 The right is formulated broadly and protects individuals’ 
autonomy and dignity in developing their personalities both privately and in 
 
 13 The right to respect for private life may also be treated as a stand-alone human right. See Dan 
Manolescu, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right, 5 EFFECTIUS NEWSLETTER 1 (2010).  
 14 Handbook On European Data Protection Law, EUROPA 1, 14 (2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/ 
files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nd-ed_en.pdf [hereinafter Data Handbook]. 
 15 European Convention on Human Rights, Dec. 4, 1950, art. 8. The ECHR was drafted under the auspices 
of Council of Europe. Id. The EU is not part of the Council of Europe, but all the EU Member States are also 
members of the Council of Europe. Data Handbook, supra note 14, at 15. The Council of Europe is an 
international organization headquartered in Strasbourg, France, has 47 member states, and was created to 
promote democracy and protect human rights in Europe. Who We Are, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2016), 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are. The EU is an economic and political union headquartered in 
Brussels, Belgium, has 28 member states, and was created to foster economic cooperation. The EU in Brief, 
EUROPA (2016), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en. 
 16 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 8. 
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relationships with others.17 Hence, the right to respect for private life is broader 
than the right to privacy because it is not limited to the protection of individuals’ 
intimate spheres but includes the right of individuals to freely pursue and fulfill 
their personalities in relationships with others.18 The right to private life is not 
absolute.19 Indeed, it can be restricted to achieve legitimate public interests like 
national security, public order, and prevention of crime.20 The right to private 
life can also be restricted to protect other human rights.21 In particular, the right 
to data protection must be balanced against the right to freedom of expression.22 
The ECtHR, created by the ECHR to ensure its observance,23 held that the 
right to respect for private life imposes positive and negative obligations on the 
contracting states.24 The state has to act affirmatively with measures to ensure 
respect of the right and must not interfere with a person’s private life, home, and 
correspondence.25  
The development of information and surveillance technology in the 1960s 
created the need to protect individuals’ private lives by strengthening their 
personal data protection.26 Accordingly, a Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 
108) was opened for signature in 1981.27 The convention applies to data 
processing by private and public entities and protects the individuals against 
abuses in the collection and storage of personal data.28 Individuals have the right 
to know that personal information about them is stored and, if necessary, to 
correct the information. Moreover, the automatic processing and storage of 
 
 17 Article 8 Right to a Private and Family Life, LIBERTY, https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/ 
human-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act/article-8-right-private-and-family-life.  
 18 Niemietz v. Germany, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1992) (“[I]t would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of 
private life] to an ‘inner circle’ in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses. . . . Respect 
for private life must also comprise . . . the right to establish and develop relationships.”); Ursula Kilkelly, The 
Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS NO.1 1, 10 (2003), https://rm.coe.int/ 
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168007ff47. 
 19 Article 8 Right to a Private and Family Life, supra note 17. 
 20 Steven Greer, The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE PUBLISHING 6 (1997), http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-
HRFILES-15(1997).pdf.  
 21 Id. at 35. 
 22 Article 8 Right to a Private and Family Life, supra note 17. 
 23 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 19. 
 24 Kroon and Others v. Netherlands, App. No. 18535/91, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 31 (1994); Kilkelly, supra note 
18, at 20.  
 25 Kilkelly, supra note 18, at 20. 
 26 Data Handbook, supra note 14, at 15. 
 27 Id. at 15–16.  
 28 Id. at 16. 
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“sensitive data” (data revealing race, political, religious and other beliefs, health 
or sexual life) are prohibited.29 With Convention 108, the Council of Europe 
aimed to protect individuals’ private and family lives against abuses in the 
automatic collection and storing of personal data introduced by the new 
information technologies.30 The convention was the first international 
instrument to recognize the right to data protection and served as inspiration for 
the enactment of the 1995 Data Protection Directive by the EU.31 
B. The European Union Framework 
Because the EU was originally conceived solely as an economic union, the 
founding treaties32 did not contain any reference to fundamental rights.33 
Nevertheless, since its creation, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) was 
confronted with fundamental rights issues, especially cases of conflicts between 
obligations of the Member States and national constitutional laws.34 The CJEU’s 
jurisprudence gradually filled the gaps of the founding treaties.35 The 
development of fundamental rights protection in the EU followed three stages.36  
In the first stage, the CJEU refused to take on any case that required an 
examination of European law in terms of fundamental rights and held that the 
protection of fundamental rights was a matter of exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Member States.37 In the second stage, criticism by the Member States and the 
establishment of the supremacy principle of EU law38 over national legislation 
 
 29 Id. at 16; to date, Convention 108 is the only legally binding international instrument in data protection, 
Details of Treaty No. 108, COUNCIL OF EUROPE 1, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/ 
conventions/treaty/108.  
 30 See Details of Treaty No. 108, COUNCIL OF EUROPE 1, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/treaty/108.  
 31 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2014 on the application of necessity and proportionality 
concepts and data protection within the law enforcement sector, 536/14 (Feb. 2014) at 3. 
 32 The Treaty of Paris created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The two Treaties 
of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) in 1957. Finn Laursen, The Founding Treaties of the European Union and Their Reform, POLITICS 
(2016), http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-978019022863 
7-e-151.  
 33 Data Handbook, supra note 14, at 20; ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 215 (3rd ed. 
2013). 
 34 KACZOROWSKA, supra note 33, at 215. 
 35 Fundamental Rights in the European Union, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/554168/EPRS_IDA(2015)554168_EN.pdf.  
 36 KACZOROWSKA, supra note 33, at 215.  
 37 See Case 1/58 Friedrich Stork & Cir v High Authority [1959] ECR 17; see also KACZOROWSKA, supra 
note 33, at 215.  
 38 The supremacy doctrine was developed by the ECJ in a series of important decisions. Under the 
doctrine, in case of conflict between European Union law and the law of Member States, European Union law 
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led the CJEU to declare that fundamental rights were general principles of EU 
law and therefore protected by the CJEU.39 Finally, in the third stage, the CJEU 
held that the Member States are also bound by EU fundamental rights when 
acting within the scope of the EU.40 The court thus ensured consistent protection 
of fundamental rights by EU institutions and national governments.41 However, 
the EU still lacked its own bill of fundamental rights.  
The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which formally created the EU, recognized 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR as fundamental principles of 
EU law.42 Accordingly, the EU recognized the right to respect for private life. 
The EU institutions then sought to enhance the protection of these rights by 
introducing an EU bill of rights. The goal was achieved through the 
proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(Charter) in 2000.43 
The Charter brings together the fundamental rights and principles protected 
in the EU, including the rights recognized by the CJEU, the rights and principles 
resulting from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, and 
the rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR.44 Although the Charter was 
originally just a political document, the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon made the Charter 
binding upon the Member States and the EU institutions.45  
The Charter guarantees not only the right to respect for private and family 
life,46 but also establishes the right to “protection of personal data,”47 making it 
a distinct fundamental right in EU law.48 The right to data protection is the right 
of individuals (data subjects) to know what, where, and how information about 
 
prevails. Supremacy of EU Law, EURWORK (May 4, 2011), https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/ 
eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/supremacy-of-eu-law.  
 39 Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm-Sozialamt [1969] ECR 419; KACZOROWSKA, supra note 33, at 
214-15, 218. 
 40 KACZOROWSKA, supra note 33, at 218.  
 41 See generally EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 35.  
 42 KACZOROWSKA, supra note 33, at 221. 
 43 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2001 O.J. C 364 [hereinafter 
Charter].  
 44 Data Handbook, supra note 14, at 20; KACZOROWSKA, supra note 33, at 215. 
 45 Handbook On European Data Protection Law, EUROPA 1, 20 (2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/ 
files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nd-ed_en.pdf; KACZOROWSKA, supra note 33, at 214. 
 46 Charter, supra note 43, art. 7 
 47 Charter, supra note 43, art. 8. 
 48 Data Handbook, supra note 14, at 20; Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party on the Application of 
Necessity and Proportionality Concepts and Data Protection Within the Law Enforcement Sector Data Protection 
Within the Law Enforcement Sector, 2014 O.J. (C 536) at 2–3. 
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them (personal data) is gathered, stored, transferred, and made public.49 The 
enforcement of this right may require the withdrawal of certain personal data 
from the public domain.50 In the EU, the right to data protection, as a general 
rule, trumps economic interests and other interests in making and keeping 
personal data public.51 Nevertheless, the right to data protection is not absolute 
and may be restricted for important public interest reasons, such as the right of 
the public to access personal information about important public figures.52  
C. The Principle of Proportionality 
Article 52 of the Charter requires any limitations on a fundamental right or 
freedom guaranteed by the Charter to be adopted by law and subject to the 
principle of proportionality.53 The principle originally developed in German 
administrative law and evolved from the case law of the ECtHR applying Article 
8 of the ECHR.54 Under the principle of proportionality, “the action of the EU 
must be limited to what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties;”55 
that is, the action can infringe upon a fundamental right only as much as is 
necessary to achieve the stated goal.56 The EU adopted the principle of 
proportionality of Article 8 of the ECHR and incorporated it in the Charter.57  
For the proportionality test to apply, an individual must first show that he 
has a fundamental right and that a governmental action infringes upon that 
right.58 If he succeeds, the burden shifts to the government to prove three 
 
 49 Dan Manolescu, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right, 5 EFFECTIUS NEWSLETTER 1 (2010). 
 50 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014). 
 51 Id. ¶ 81. 
 52 In this case, keeping public and accessible personal information in the name of the right to freedom of 
information might be justifiable. See, e.g., CJEU, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Markus 
Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, 9 November 2010, ¶ 48. 
 53 Charter, supra note 43, art. 52. 
 54 Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party on the Application of Necessity and Proportionality Concepts 
and Data Protection Within the Law Enforcement Sector Data Protection, 2014 O.J. (C 536) at 2–3 [hereinafter 
Working Party Opinion]; Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, American Balancing and German Proportionality: 
The Historical Origins, 8 INT’L. J. CONST. L., 263, 266 (2010). 
 55 Proportionality Principle, EURLEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/proportionality.html.  
 56 Charter, supra note 43, art. 52; PENELOPE KENT, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 45–46 (Harlow 
Longman ed., 3rd ed. 2001). Under many aspects, the principle of proportionality resembles the balancing 
doctrine in the American constitutional system, although the balancing doctrine in not an established doctrine in 
the American juridical system. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 54, at 265.  
 57 See Working Party Opinion, supra note 54, at 4.  
 58 See Case C-292/97, Kjell Karlsson and Others, 2000 E.C.R. I-02737; Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union, at 13 (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/554168/ 
EPRS_IDA(2015)554168_EN.pdf. 
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elements: (1) that the limitation is in accordance with the law;59 (2) that the 
pursued goal is legitimate; and (3) that the action was necessary to achieve the 
stated goal.60 Proportionality is broadly interpreted as part of the necessity 
element and requires that the stated goal of the restriction cannot be achieved 
through less restrictive means.61 If the stated goal of the restriction can be 
achieved by less restrictive means, and if less restrictive means are available, 
then the measure is not proportional.62 The CJEU found that, “in assessing 
whether processing is necessary, the legislature is obliged, inter alia, to examine 
whether it is possible to envisage measures which will interfere less with the 
rights recognized by Art[icles] 7 and 8 of the Charter but will still contribute 
effectively to the objectives of the EU rules in question.”63  
Although the Charter recognized the right of data protection as a 
fundamental right and provided a standard for its enforceability,64 the EU still 
lacked a thorough legislative regulation of the right to data protection. 
II. FROM THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE OF 1995 TO THE GOOGLE SPAIN 
DECISION: THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
The EU first regulated the right to data protection with the Data Protection 
Directive of 1995 (DPD).65 Twenty years later, in the Google Spain case, the 
CJEU interpreted the DPD to recognize the right to be forgotten (RTBF).66 This 
 
 59 To be in accordance with the law, the governmental activity must be based on domestic law and “be 
compatible with the rule of law” and must be “adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the individual to regulate his or her conduct.” Working Party Opinion, supra note 
54, at 5. 
 60 Working Party Opinion, supra note 54, at 5; Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 54, at 267. 
 61 Working Party Opinion, supra note 54, at 12; KENT, supra note 56, at 45–46. For example, refusal to 
withdraw a secretly recorded video of an individual’s intimate moments from the public domain would likely be 
disproportional because the individual right to private life outweighs the right to information. On the other hand, 
refusal to withdraw from the public domain a video about a famous actor’s or a politician’s extramarital affair 
may not be disproportional because the public interest in the information likely outweighs the individual’s 
interest.  
 62 See Working Party Opinion, supra note 54, at 12. 
 63 Case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum, ECLI:EU:C:2013:401 (2013) ¶ 46. The European 
courts may apply the principle of proportionality to cases involving very different interests and that involve both 
legislative and administrative acts. Takis Tridimas, Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the 
Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 67 (Hart 
Publ. 1999). Accordingly, the intensity of the court’s review may vary considerably in consideration, for 
example, of how strictly the court is willing to apply the test and on how much it is willing to defer to the EU 
authority’s discretion. Id. 
 64 See Tridimas, supra note 63, at 67. 
 65 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter DPD]. 
 66 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014). 
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section provides an overlook of the DPD and the CJEU decision, with particular 
reference to the evolution of the right to data protection in the face of the advent 
and development of the Internet. 
A. The 1995 Data Protection Directive 
The European Parliament and Council enacted the DPD to regulate the free 
flow of personal data across the EU Member States and to set a baseline of 
protection for the “fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in 
particular their right to privacy.”67 The necessity to harmonize the regulation of 
the right to privacy came from the recently created European Single Market.68 
The EU predicted that free movement of goods, capital, services, and people 
would cause a substantial increase in cross-border flows of personal data, which 
required a uniform level of data protection.69 
The DPD is, as a directive, sui generis. Whereas typically European 
directives provide a broad regulatory goal and leave the Member States wide 
discretion to determine the time and mode of implementation, the DPD allows 
only limited freedom of implementation.70 The EU legislature wanted to 
harmonize national privacy laws across the Member States without reducing 
protection.71  
The DPD regulates the collection and processing of personal data and 
imposes obligations on data controllers, which are entities that determine the 
means and purposes of the processing of personal data.72 Personal data has been 
defined as, “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person.”73 First, States must provide that controllers may collect personal data 
only for “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”74 in a way that is 
“adequate, relevant and not excessive” with respect to the purpose for which the 
 
 67 DPD, supra note 65, ¶ 38.  
 68 See id. ¶ 7. 
 69 DPD, supra note 65, ¶¶ 5, 7; Data Handbook, supra note 14, at 17–18. 
 70 Data Handbook, supra note 14, at 18; see Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPEAN UNION 
(2016), https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en. 
 71 See DPD, supra note 65, ¶ 1. 
 72 Id. art. 2(d). 
 73 Id. art. 2(a). Under EU law, personal data is information that either directly identifies an individual or 
describes an individual in a way which makes it identifiable by conducting further research. Data Handbook, 
supra note 14, at 36.  
 74 DPD, supra note 65, art. 6(1)(b). 
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data are collected.75 Second, the Member States must provide that personal data 
are processed “fairly and lawfully.”76 
Even if the RTBF was not yet born, the DPD contained a “right of 
rectification” that allowed individuals to obtain rectification, erasure, or 
blocking of incomplete or inaccurate data.77 This provision laid down the 
foundation for the RTBF in the Google Spain decision.78 Finally, the DPD 
permits controllers to store personal data only during the time necessary to 
collect and process the data as originally intended.79 Although the DPD 
contained traces of the main features of the RTBF, the time was not ripe for its 
recognition. 
B. The Development of the Internet and the New Needs of Data Protection 
When the DPD was enacted, the Internet looked nothing like it does today.80 
In 1995, only 0.4% of the world population used the Internet, vis-à-vis fifty 
percent today.81 Computers had slower processors and smaller memories, which 
made online research difficult and time-consuming.82 Many households did not 
even have a computer or an Internet connection.83 Search engines were scarce 
and undeveloped.84 For example, the Yahoo.com domain was registered in 
January 1995, only a few months before the directive’s enactment.85 Google did 
not exist.86 In the late 1990s, the amount of content available online increased 
 
 75 Id. art. 6(1)(c).  
 76 Id. art. 6(1)(a). 
 77 Id. art. 6(1)(d); Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to 
Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1028 (2016). 
 78 Lee, supra note 77, at 1028. 
 79 DPD, supra note 65, art. 6(1)(e). 
 80 In the Google Spain case, Advocate General Jääskinen pointed out: “[When] the Directive was adopted 
in 1995 the internet had barely begun and . . . rudimentary search engines started to appear. . . . Nowadays almost 
anyone with a smartphone or a computer could be considered to be engaged in activities . . . to which the 
Directive could potentially apply.” Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen ¶ 10, Case C-131/12, Google Spain 
SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 
13, 2014); Lee, supra note 77, at 1029. 
 81 Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing. 
htm. 
 82 Cf. Comparing Today’s Computers to 1995’s, RELATIVELY INTERESTING (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www.relativelyinteresting.com/comparing-todays-computers-to-1995s/ (discussing the “mind boggling” 
advancements made in the Internet browsing experience). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See generally Tom Seymour et al., 15 INT’L J. MGM’T & INFO. SYS. 47, 48 (2011). 
 85 Computer History—1995, COMPUTER HOPE, http://www.computerhope.com/history/1995.htm (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2017). 
 86 The Google.com domain was registered on September 15, 1997, by Larry Page and Sergey Brinand. 
The company was incorporated on September 4, 1998, and was based in the garage of a friend (Susan Wojcicki) 
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exponentially as evidenced by the number of websites growing from 
approximately 3,000 in 1994 to more than 1 billion in 2014 (a thirty-three 
million percent increase).87 
The growth of online content and use of the Internet generated a permanent 
database of personal information.88 Because servers have an almost unlimited 
capacity, virtually all information uploaded online is automatically stored as a 
default procedure.89 The Internet has made information not only accessible but 
also eternal.  
The Internet’s capacity to store information indefinitely was in tension with 
the text of the Directive, especially where the Directive provided that controllers 
could store personal data “for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for 
which the data were collected or . . . processed.”90 That tension remained for 
almost twenty years until the issue was presented to the European Court of 
Justice in the Google Spain decision. 
C. Google Spain and the Recognition of the Right to be Forgotten 
In 2014, the CJEU faced the issue of applying the DPD to the Internet when 
the Spanish High Court asked for the interpretation of the DPD and its 
application to search engines.91 The questions arose from a 2010 case of Mario 
Costeja González, a Spanish citizen, against a Spanish newspaper, Google 
Spain, and Google Inc. for infringement of his privacy rights.92 
1. The Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
In March 2010, Costeja lodged a complaint with the Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD), the Spanish data protection agency that 
administers the DPD in Spain.93 Costeja alleged that a Google search of his name 
would return links to two articles of a widely-sold newspaper, where Costeja’s 
 
in Menlo Park. Our History in Depth, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/about/company/history/ (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2017).  
 87 Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/total-number-of-
websites/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2017).  
 88 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power–Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2001). 
 89 Lee, supra note 77, at 1029. 
 90 DPD, supra note 65, art.12. 
 91 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014) ¶¶ 18–20. 
 92 Id. ¶ 14. 
 93 Id. 
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house appeared for a real estate auction in connection with attachment 
proceedings for the recovery of his debts.94 Those facts and articles dated back 
twelve years.95 
Costeja contended that the publication of that information violated his right 
to privacy under the DPD because the matter had been resolved and the news 
was entirely irrelevant.96 He asked the AEPD to order the newspaper to remove 
or alter the articles so that his name no longer appeared and to order Google to 
remove links to the pages from the search results for Costeja’s name.97 
The AEPD denied Costeja’s complaint against the newspaper but ruled in 
his favor against Google. The agency found that the newspaper had no obligation 
to remove the information contained in the announcements because the 
announcements had been lawfully published.98 On the other hand, the agency 
concluded that Google—and search engines in general—was a data controller 
subject to the DPD and, upon the individual’s request, had the obligation to 
remove links to personal data that may violate the individual’s dignity and 
fundamental rights to data protection.99 The agency interpreted the individual 
rights broadly to include the mere wish of the person that such data would not 
become known to third parties.100 To comply with the decision, Google had to 
conceal the data concerning Costeja by removing the link to the information 
without having to erase the information itself from the website.101  
Google Spain and Google Inc. appealed to the Spanish high court, which 
referred the question of the proper interpretation of the DPD to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling.102 
2. The Court of Justice of the European Union  
The CJEU’s decision was consistent with the AEPD’s interpretation of the 
Data Protection Directive.103 Before analyzing if any obligation may attach to 
Google, the CJEU addressed two preliminary issues: (1) whether search engines 
fell within the definition of “data controller” of the DPD; and (2) whether the 
 
 94 Id.  
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. ¶ 15. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. ¶ 16. 
 99 Id. ¶ 17. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. 
 102 Id. ¶¶ 18–20. 
 103 See Lee, supra note 77, at 1031. 
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DPD applied to Google even if Google is headquartered outside EU territory. 
The court answered both questions in the affirmative.104 
The Court found that search engines are data controllers because, by 
indexing information, they disseminate information that would not have been 
otherwise easily reachable.105 An Internet search of a person’s name, for 
example, returns a collection of results that together creates a “more or less 
detailed profile of the data subject.”106 Search engines also process personal data 
because they collect, record, and store data on their servers to disclose it and 
make it available to users in the form of search results.107 Because all of these 
activities fall within the directive’s definition of “processing of personal 
data,”108 Google must comply with the DPD.109  
In addition, the Court held that Google is subject to the territorial application 
of the DPD. Although Google Inc.—the parent company that operates Google 
Search—is incorporated in the United States, its subsidiary Google Spain acted 
as a commercial agent for the Google group in Spain, where it sold and marketed 
advertising space on “www.google.com.”110 Because the sale of advertising 
space associated with the user’s search terms is the main source of revenue for 
search engines operators, the court concluded that Google Spain’s activity was 
“inextricably linked” to Google Inc.’s data processing activity.111 Accordingly, 
 
 104 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos: Court of Justice of the European Union 
Creates Presumption that Google Must Remove Links to Personal Data upon Request, HARV. L. REV. 735, 736–
38 (2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/12/google-spain-sl-v-agencia-espanola-de-proteccion-de-datos/; 
The CJEU’s Google Spain Judgment: Failing to Balance Privacy and Freedom of Expression, EU LAW 
ANALYSIS (May 13, 2014), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/05/the-cjeus-google-spain-judgment-
failing.html.  
 105 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014) ¶¶ 17, 100. 
 106 Id. ¶ 37; see Elena Perotti, The European Ruling on the Right to Be Forgotten and Its Extra-EU 
Implementation 11 (Dec. 14, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2703325 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.27033 
25. 
 107 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014) ¶ 28. 
 108 DPD, supra note 65, art. 2(b). 
 109 The CJEU found it irrelevant that search engines carry out the same activities with respect of other 
kinds of information and without affecting a selection between personal data and other information. Case C-
131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 2014 EUR-Lex 
62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014) ¶ ¶ 21, 28. 
 110 The court described the market structure of the Internet and the role of Google Search and other search 
engines, which not only provide access to content hosted on the indexed websites, but also sells advertising 
associated with the Internet users’ search terms. Id. ¶ 43. 
 111 Id. ¶ 55. The DPD only requires that the processing of personal data be carried out “in the context of 
the activities” of a company, not necessarily by the company itself. Id. ¶ 52. 
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Google Inc. was sufficiently present in the EU territory to be subject to the 
DPD.112  
The broad scope of the rule was the result of a teleological reading of the 
DPD. The Court reasoned that because the EU legislature intended to provide 
effective privacy protection, an extensive interpretation of the directive was 
necessary.113 Thus, the decision opened the doors to RTBF claims against data 
controllers based outside of the EU.  
The Court then turned to the issue of determining search engines’ 
obligations114 and held that individuals have the right to obtain the rectification, 
erasure, or blockage of data which is incomplete or inaccurate from search 
engines.115  
The Court considered that the DPD implements Articles 7 and 8 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which protects the right to private life and the 
right to privacy of personal data, and concluded that the protection of those rights 
encompasses the “right to be forgotten.”116 Those rights allow individuals to 
request that search engines remove links to search results containing personal 
information.117 Therefore, the Court established a presumption that the 
individual right to privacy trumps the general public’s right to access 
information as well as the economic interest of the search engine.118 
The presumption can be overcome only if, given the identity of the 
individual, there is a “preponderant interest of the general public in  
having . . . access to the information.”119 Otherwise, individuals can request the 
removal of links to web content containing personal information that is either 
“inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in relation to the purposes of the 
processing,” “not kept up to date,” or “kept for longer than is necessary.”120 The 
search engines’ obligation to de-link personal information exists independently 
 
 112 Id. ¶¶ 55–56, 60.  
 113 Id. ¶ 54. 
 114 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos: Court of Justice of the European Union 
Creates Presumption that Google Must Remove Links to Personal Data upon Request, supra note 104.  
 115 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014) ¶¶ 70, 88. 
 116 Id. ¶ 1; the Court did not use that term beyond that reference. Lee, supra note 77, at 1031. 
 117 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014) ¶¶ 81, 97. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. ¶ 97. For example, if the person is a public figure and there is a general public interest in the 
information. 
 120 Id. ¶ 92. 
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from a similar obligation directed to the publisher, so even if the information is 
true and has been lawfully published, like in the Costeja’s case, the search engine 
must remove it if the publication of the personal information infringes upon a 
data subject’s privacy.121 
3. Critiques to the Google Spain Decision 
The Google Spain decision is a landmark decision for data protection in the 
EU and sets the basis for users’ rights on the Internet. Despite that, the vagueness 
of the decision has attracted some criticism.122 Although the CJEU claimed to 
establish a rule that the right to privacy trumps the right to information and the 
search engine’s economic interest, it also required balancing those rights and 
interests in light of the principle of proportionality.123 Namely, requests to delete 
personal information must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account the accuracy, adequacy, and relevance of the information compared to 
the purposes of the data processing.124  
In Google Spain, the CJEU did not indicate how to apply this principle or 
how to strike this balance. Namely, it did not explain why Costeja’s information 
had to be removed, whether because it was sixteen years old, it was 
embarrassing, or the matter had been resolved. In fact, the Court clarified the 
recognition of the RTBF is not conditioned upon the existence of prejudice to 
the data subject.125 So, the Court seemed to suggest a case-by-case approach in 
the resolution of RTBF claims.126  
The decision is also unclear as to who should strike the balance.127 It is 
possible that the CJEU has placed the onus on search engines to balance the right 
to privacy and the right to information.128 Because individuals have direct 
 
 121 The CJEU specified that the exception Directive regarding “the processing of personal data carried out 
solely for journalistic purposes” and “necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom 
of expression” did not apply to search engines. Id. ¶ 85. 
 122 Perotti, supra note 106, at 11–12; Lee, supra note 77, at 1033. 
 123 Lee, supra note 77, at 1034.  
 124 Factsheet on “The Right to be Forgotten Ruling,” 6 EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) (“[C]riteria for accuracy 
and relevance . . . may critically depend on how much time has passed since the original references to a person. 
While some search results . . . may remain relevant even after a considerable passage of time, others will not be 
so, and an individual may legitimately ask to have them deleted.”).  
 125 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (‘Costeja’), 
2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ0131, ¶ 17 (May 13, 2014) ¶ 96. 
 126 Id.; Lee, supra note 77, at 1034. 
 127 Compare Douglas, supra note 2, at 110, with Perotti, supra note 106, at 11–12. 
 127 Douglas, supra note 2, at 109. 
 128 Compare Douglas, supra note 2, at 109–10, with Perotti, supra note 106, at 11–12. 
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recourse to the search engine providers to request the de-linking of information, 
corporations may be called to balance fundamental rights. This interpretation 
raises concerns that the economic interest of the corporation may not align with 
the individual interest in data protection.129 In other words, the interest of search 
engine providers is to produce and maximize their shareholders’ profits.130 To 
minimize the risk of litigation and costs, search engine providers may grant 
every request to be forgotten and consequentially limit the information available 
online.131  
After the decision, Google and other search engine providers adopted a more 
proactive role in the de-linking of information to prevent themselves from being 
sued.132 They established internal procedures and guidelines to handle RTBF 
claims.133 Nevertheless, the lack of an established formula to strike the balance 
between the right to data protection and the right to freedom of information may 
be reflected in conflicting decisions in the adjudication of RTBF claims. 
Whereas a search engine provider may accept a request to be forgotten, another 
may consider different elements and reject the same claim. 
4. Examples of Other Cases 
Despite the critiques, the recognition of the RTBF has proven to be in line 
with the European Union’s protective approach to the individual right to privacy. 
In the 2014 case Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU applied a proportionality test 
to strike down a European directive that allowed retention of data from fixed, 
mobile, or Internet telephony, as well as e-mail communications from six 
months to two years.134 The Court balanced the compression of the right to 
personal data protection with the public interest to security and, even if the 
interference in the right to privacy could be justified by a general interest to 
prevent crime and facilitate investigations,135 the Court held the interference was 
 
 129 Douglas, supra note 2, at 109. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 109. The decision could address the referring tribunal, the Spanish High Court, which had 
requested the court’s interpretation of the DPD. Under this interpretation, judicial bodies must strike the balance 
between fundamental rights. Perotti, supra note 106, at 11–12. 
 132 See Lee, supra note 77, at 1017, 1044. 
 133 See id. 
 134 Joined Cases C-293 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, Marine 
and Natural Resources, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, 
Ireland, The Attorney General, and Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others, 
2014 ECR I-238; DPD supra note 65 ¶¶ 5–6.  
 135 The enactment of the directive was prompted by the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London 
in 2005. See Francesca Bignami, Protecting Privacy against the Police in the European Union: The Data 
Retention Directive, 8 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 233, (2007); Mira Burri & Rahel Schär, The Reform of the EU Data 
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too extensive and too dangerous.136 Moreover, the scope of the state’s intrusion 
on the right to privacy was not proportional to its objectives, and the norms 
regulating the collection and retention of data were too imprecise.137 Therefore, 
the CJEU invalidated the directive because it violated Articles 7 and 8 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.138 
In 2015, the CJEU affirmed the protection of the right to data protection of 
European citizens in the cross-border setting when it overturned a Commission 
decision creating a safe harbor for data protection between the EU and the 
United States. The Commission’s decision aimed to provide uniform protection 
for personal data transfers across countries’ borders.139 The decision also 
instructed the European Commission to determine whether a country ensured an 
adequate level of protection for the transfer of data; that is, equivalent to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed within the EU.140 An Austrian 
citizen sued the Irish supervisory authority (the Data Protection Commissioner) 
because it refused to investigate his complaint that Facebook Ireland’s practice 
of transferring and storing user data in the United States violated his rights to 
privacy.141 Examining the level of protection of personal data, the Court found 
that the American legislation failed the proportionality test for three reasons: (1) 
it allowed unrestricted storage of personal information transferred from the EU 
to the United States, without any “differentiation, limitation or exception” based 
on the objective of collection and storage;142 (2) it failed to provide an objective 
criterion to limit public authorities’ access to and use of the data;143 and (3) it 
failed to provide legal remedies for individuals to access their personal data or 
 
Protection Framework: Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-driven Economy, 6 J. 
INFO. POL’Y 479, 484 (2016). 
 136 Joined Cases C-293 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, Marine 
and Natural Resources, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, 
Ireland, The Attorney General, and Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others, 
2014 ECR I-238 ¶ 44. 
 137 Id. ¶ 64. 
 138 Id. 
 139 The safe harbor scheme provides a series of principles for the protection of personal data to which 
United States’ undertakings may subscribe on a voluntary basis. Commission Decision 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 
215/7). 
 140 Id.  
 141 C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner 2015, ECLI: EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 2. 
 142 Id. ¶ 93. 
 143 Id. 
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to obtain rectification or erasure of that data.144 Thus, the Court invalidated the 
Safe Harbor Decision because it violated the Data Protection Directive.145 
The three CJE decisions above emphasize that, although the Court 
consistently applied the proportionality test to data protection, the EU data 
protection framework was inconsistent and fragmentary across the Member 
States, posing a risk of unequal protection of EU citizens. The EU legislature 
needed a uniform procedural and substantive regulation of the RTBF. The next 
section examines the changes introduced by the 2016 General Data Protection 
Regulation and its effects on the RTBF. 
III. THE “RIGHT TO ERASURE” AND THE GDPR DIRECTIVE OF 2016 
With an outdated, non-self-executing legislative document and a few judicial 
decisions defining and protecting the RTBF, the EU needed a sweeping reform 
to keep up with the recent technological advances and harmonize data 
protection. Accordingly, in 2015 the EU Commission announced the Digital 
Single Market Strategy to tear down “regulatory walls” among the Member 
States and project them in the digital age.146 As part of that strategy, in April 
2016, the European Parliament and Council enacted the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which replaced the DPD.147 With the GPDR, the EU 
legislature chose a different regulatory instrument: a regulation instead of a 
directive. This choice is symptomatic of the legislature’s will to reach greater 
and faster implementation and uniformity. Unlike directives, regulations are 
self-executing and do not require domestic implementation by the Member 
States.148 Regulations immediately become part of the national legal system and 
 
 144 Id. ¶ 98 (“In particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised 
basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter”). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Commission Communication for a Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, at 1, COM (2015) 192 
final (May 6, 2015). 
 147 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) [hereinafter GDPR]. The Regulation entered into 
force on May 24, 2016, and will be effective as of May 25, 2018. The GDPR is part of a broader Digital Data 
Reform, which also includes a directive for the police and criminal justice sector. Directive 2016/680 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the 
Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of 
Criminal Penalties, and on the Free Movement of Such Data. Similar to the Regulation, the directive entered 
into force on May 5, 2016, and will be effective as of May 6, 2018. Reform of the EU Data Protection Rules, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm. 
 148 See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPEAN UNION (2016), https://europa.eu/european-
union/law/legal-acts_en.  
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supersede contrary national laws.149 The GDPR seeks to clarify and harmonize 
data protection.150 Particularly, it grants an unprecedented level of “data 
sovereignty,” meaning that data are subject to EU laws if processed in a Member 
State, independently from where they are collected.151 The RTBF—now also 
called “right to erasure”152—is one of the regulation’s main focuses. This section 
highlights the salient features of the RTBF protection, compares the new 
regulation with the DPD, and exposes some critiques to the regulation.  
A. The Right to Be Forgotten in the GDPR 
The GDPR provides that individuals have the right to obtain the prompt 
erasure of personal data from search engines when: (1) the information is no 
longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which it was collected or 
processed; (2) the individual withdrew consent or objected to the processing and 
there are no “legitimate grounds for the processing;” or (3) the personal data 
have been unlawfully processed.153 Similar to the RTBF in Google Spain, the 
retention of personal data is lawful when necessary for: (1) exercising the right 
of freedom of expression and information, (2) complying with a legal obligation, 
(3) defending legal claims, or (4) achieving public interest purposes in the areas 
of public health, scientific and historical research, or statistics.154 
Although the RTBF’s limitations are similar to the ones established in 
Google Spain, its protection is strengthened by the fact that, if a controller is 
obligated to erase personal data that it made public, it must take reasonable steps 
to inform other controllers who also published the personal data to erase any link 
 
 149 Burri & Schär, supra note 135, at 489.  
 150 See How Will The EU’s Data Protection Reform Strengthen the Internal Market?, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/4_strenghten_2016_en.pdf.  
 151 GDPR, supra note 147, art. 3; see Quentyn Taylor, Border Control: The Age of Data Sovereignty, 
INFOSECURITY EUR. (May 27, 2016), http://blogs.infosecurityeurope.com/border-control-the-age-of-data-
sovereignty/.  
 152 GDPR, supra note 147, art. 17. 
 153 Id. (“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data 
concerning him or her without undue delay, and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data 
without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: (a) the personal data are no longer necessary 
in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; (b) the data subject withdraws 
consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and 
where there is no other legal ground for the processing; (c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to 
Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the 
processing pursuant to Article 21(2); (d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; (e) the personal data 
have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller 
is subject; (f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred 
to in Article 8(1).”). 
 154 Id. preamble 65, art. 7(3). 
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to or copies of it.155 This provision targets an issue that Google Spain left 
unresolved. Although Costeja’s RTBF claim succeeded against Google, it was 
unclear whether other search engines would comply with the decision, as the 
same link may have appeared on Yahoo or Bing. Under the GDPR provision, 
there will likely be broader protection for individuals because other controllers 
will be notified that the individual has a valid claim to be forgotten. The 
controllers may then remove the link as a pre-emptive strategy to avoid being 
sued themselves, which will ensure a more uniform application of the GDPR. 
Therefore, the GDPR guides search engines to duly balance the right to privacy 
and the right to information, and more guidance for the data controllers will 
result in greater uniformity of decision in RTBF claims.156 
Additionally, if individuals do not meet the requirements to obtain erasure, 
they can require controllers to restrict the information. Namely, individuals can 
compel controllers to obtain consent to further process the information if: (1) 
they contest the accuracy of data, (2) the processing is unlawful, (3) the 
controllers no longer need the personal data, or (4) they objected to the existence 
of a public or legitimate interest to the processing of the data.157 If the restriction 
is granted, the controllers can use these individuals’ personal data only for 
storage purposes, unless there are important public interest reasons or if the 
information is necessary to protect the rights of another legal or natural 
person.158 
B. The Obligations on Controllers and Processors 
In addition to providing more protection for Internet users, the GDPR also 
imposes more stringent obligations on data intermediaries. The DPD identified 
two categories of intermediaries: controllers and processors. Controllers are 
entities that “determin[e] the purpose and means of the processing of personal 
data,” whereas processors are entities that process (that is, collect, record, 
organize, or otherwise use) the personal data on behalf of the controller.159 
However, only data controllers were subject to obligations.160 This aspect was 
heavily criticized because the advent of search engines and social networks 
 
 155 Id. art. 17(1). Controllers are entities that define the purpose and ways of processing personal data. See 
infra Part III.B. 
 156 If the search engines do not remove the link, the data subject may file a complaint against them. The 
court would apply the proportionality test to determine whether deletion of the link is an appropriate measure to 
protect the subject’s right to privacy. 
 157 Id. art. 18(1). 
 158 Id. art. 18(2). 
 159 Id. art. 1(1), 2(2d), 2(2e). 
 160 Burri & Schär, supra note 135, at 494. 
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advanced processing rapidly, making it difficult to distinguish between 
controllers and processors.161 Consequently, data intermediaries could easily 
elude the data protection provisions.162 
The GDPR maintains these two categories but imposes obligations on 
both.163 Under the new discipline, processors have an independent obligation to 
ensure the security of personal data.164 For example, processors must ensure 
compliance with the GDPR to be appointed by controllers.165 Accordingly, 
processors must report all information necessary to demonstrate compliance 
with the regulation and permit audits conducted by the controller.166 When 
processing personal data, processors must follow controllers’ written 
instructions and impose confidentiality obligations on all personnel who process 
the data.167  
Controllers’ obligations under the GDPR are more stringent than under the 
DPD. For example, controllers must provide data protection “by design or 
default,” meaning that they must ensure maximum privacy protection as a 
baseline.168 To do so, controllers must process personal data limited to the 
specific purpose for which they were processed.169 This obligation impinges on 
the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period 
of their storage, and their accessibility. Privacy by default applies the principle 
of proportionality because it safeguards a minimal invasion of the right to 
privacy. 
Moreover, the GDPR imposes heavier burdens of proof compared to the 
DPD. First, controllers must prove they obtained the individual’s consent to the 
processing of personal data.170 Second, if the individual objects to the processing 
of data, the controller must demonstrate “compelling legitimate grounds . . . 
which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject” to justify 
the processing of personal data and keep the information online.171 Therefore, 
some authors argued that the GDPR makes it easier to object to online 
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information and have it removed because providing proof of consent and, 
especially, of compelling legitimate grounds may be time- and resource-
consuming for the controller.172 
Finally, unlike the DPD, the GDPR provides for heavy administrative 
sanctions. For infringement of the RTBF, controllers and processors could be 
fined up to €20 million or up to four percent of their total worldwide annual 
turnover of the preceding financial year.173 
IV. THE CONTEXT OF THE GDPR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
There is a concern that the GDPR may be burdensome to implement because 
it requires data controllers and processors to jump through too many hoops. 
Namely, the heavy burdens of proof and the high administrative fines for breach 
of the right to data protection may discourage the creation of start-ups and impair 
scientific research.174 These critics, however, fail to consider two points. First, 
that the new normative framework of the RTBF is consistent with the well-
established protection of the right to respect for private life recognized and 
protected in international law by the ECtHR. Second, that the GDPR will not 
harm the right to information because the Internet market structure will 
safeguard the right to information and the search engine’s economic rights.  
A. The GDPR Follows Well Established Standards in International Law by 
the European Court of Human Rights 
The GDPR is consistent with the judicial practices of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. As seen in Part 
I, the protection of human rights in the international community and in the EU 
is interconnected. Since its creation, the EU has recognized the fundamental 
rights in the ECHR as fundamental principles of EU law, including the right to 
data protection.175 The Charter of Fundamental Rights includes the rights and 
freedoms protected by the ECHR.176 Particularly, the right to protection for 
private life in Article 7 of the Charter corresponds to the one guaranteed in 
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Article 8 of the ECHR,177 and when the Charter contains rights that correspond 
to the ECHR, “the meaning and scope of those rights [are] the same.”178  
Because the fundamental rights protected by the ECtHR are also applicable 
to the Member States, the ECJ established a close dialogue with the Strasbourg 
court and drew from its judicial practice.179 The GDPR, and the DPD before it, 
are in line with the international law standards that prioritize the protection of 
fundamental rights over economic interests.180 
Nevertheless, the GDPR has been criticized for providing a level of 
protection that is still too general because the list of justifications for retaining 
personal data in the public domain is too open and broad.181 These critiques fail 
to consider that a narrow discipline of data protection would ultimately 
jeopardize the effectiveness of the protection. The GDPR should not provide too 
much detail because a narrow focus on data protection would disregard the 
complexity of balancing conflicting interests and applying the proportionality 
principle, which are part of European legal traditions.182  
Hence, the EU should continue to develop and interpret the GDPR through 
judicial practice, as past experience has shown that an exceedingly detailed 
definition of a right may impair its effective protection. When the European 
Commission and Parliament enacted the directives against discrimination, they 
provided a closed list of grounds of discrimination. This list includes 
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin,183 religion, beliefs, disability, 
age, and sexual orientation.184 The directives soon proved insufficient to grant 
effective protection against discrimination not covered by the directives. For 
example, with respect to gender discrimination, the number of CJEU judgments 
that discuss the directives is marginal compared to the high number of 
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decisions.185 In addition, the implementation of the DPD demonstrates that the 
Internet develops too fast to warrant a detailed definition.  
Moreover, the international legal system offers auxiliary tools to interpret 
and apply the GDPR. Because the data protections in both the international legal 
system and the EU legal systems are interconnected, the CJEU can rely on the 
ECtHR jurisprudence when interpreting the GDPR.  
B. Two-Sided Markets and Network Effects 
The GDPR may make enforcement of the RTBF difficult for search engines. 
The enhanced burden of proof and the possibility of being hit with high penalties 
may bring search engines to grant every request of erasure, thereby jeopardizing 
the right to information.186 
However, the Internet market structure suggests that the GDPR will not 
hinder the right to information and that the market will find an equilibrium 
between the right to privacy and the right to information. 
The Internet is a two-sided market; that is, a market where platforms connect 
and enable interactions between two or more groups of users.187 These platforms 
try to attract and charge each side in an attempt to produce value.188 For example, 
video game platforms like Sony PlayStation or Microsoft Xbox try to attract 
gamers in an effort to induce game developers to work for their platforms. At 
the same time, these platforms also need these developers to create games which 
induce gamers to buy their console.189 
Two-sided markets create “network effects” because the greater the number 
of users, the more benefits the group receives.190 For example, if a newspaper 
publishes fewer news stories, the readers will buy their newspaper from another 
publisher. As a result, advertising companies who publish their ads on the 
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newspaper will also walk away because their profits depend on how many 
readers buy the newspaper.191 
In the Internet market, search engines are the platforms that connect Internet 
users on one side with Internet content providers on the other side.192 The 
network effects will give search engines the economic incentives to balance the 
right to privacy and the right to freedom of information and prevent them from 
removing too much information from the Internet. 
Like in the newspaper example, if search engines grant all the requests to be 
forgotten irrespective of their merits, the information available on the platform 
will diminish. Users will start leaving the platform to find information on 
another search engine, and the content providers will eventually leave the 
platform as well because the loss of users causes the platform to lose value. On 
the other hand, if the search engines do not grant any requests to be forgotten, 
they will likely face high litigation costs and suffer reputational harm.193 
In addition, the right to obtain removal of information only applies to the 
link to personal information and not to the information itself.194 Accordingly, 
when the search engine strikes the balance in favor of the right to privacy, the 
right to freedom of information is not completely suppressed because the search 
engine can only remove the link to the information from its platform, not from 
the Internet as a whole. Internet users can potentially still access that same 
information through other search engines. 
Finally, the GDPR only applies to the EU. Even if a user obtains the removal 
of private information from one of Google’s European domains, the information 
can potentially still be found with a search on Google’s U.S. domain. For 
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example, Google restricted its compliance to the Google Spain decision by 
removing the search results only in its European domains.195 
Once we take into account the Internet market structure, the scope of the 
RTBF, and the lack of a global framework of the RTBF protection, the GDPR 
does not have the envisaged negative impact on the right to freedom of 
information.  
CONCLUSION 
The advancements in information technology and the amount of personal 
information that is increasingly uploaded and exchanged on the Internet pose 
serious risks of breaches of the fundamental right to protection of personal data. 
In 2016, the EU legislature enacted the GDPR which recognizes and protects 
the RTBF as a fundamental right, enabling individuals to request and obtain 
from search engines providers the removal of links to personal data that are 
prejudicial or offensive to them. The right to be forgotten is not absolute and 
may be restricted for important public interest concerns, but the restriction must 
comply with the principle of proportionality. Accordingly, the restriction can 
impinge upon the individual right to data privacy protection only as much as it 
is necessary to achieve a legitimate goal, such as protecting the freedom of 
information. 
The GDPR imposes on search engine providers the burden to prove not only 
that the proportionality principle is met but also that there are compelling 
legitimate grounds that justify keeping the information online, thus overriding 
the individual’s right to keep the information private. Moreover, the GDPR 
imposes heavy monetary sanctions on controllers and processors that do not 
meet the proportionality test, which can be up to four percent of their total 
worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year. 
This new regulation has been accused of imposing too great a burden on 
search engine providers and incentivizing them to grant every request for 
removal of personal data from the Internet to avoid the sanctions. If this criticism 
were correct, the regulation may unduly compress the right of access to 
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information and the freedom of expression because search engines would grant 
all requests to be forgotten regardless of their merits.  
This Comment argued that the GDPR will not have the predicted negative 
impact on the right to freedom of information. First, the regulation is in line with 
the international law standards of the ECtHR and the ECHR that prioritize the 
protection of fundamental rights, particularly the right to private life, over 
economic interests. Second, the network effects in the Internet market will 
incentivize search engines to balance the right to privacy and the right to 
freedom of information and prevent search engine providers from removing too 
much information from the Internet. 
On the contrary, the GDPR will not harm the right to information and will 
guide search engine providers to duly balance the right to be forgotten and the 
right to information, ensuring a more effective protection of the fundamental 
right to data protection. 
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